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1 .  I N T R O D U C T I O N :  T H E  I M P L I C AT I O N S  O F  R E C E N T  R E V E R S A L S 
In developing countries and advanced economies alike public pensions are often the biggest type of 
expenditures for social protection. The rise of private pensions across the world has therefore received 
a lot of attention from practitioners and academics alike.1 Ever since Chile – a ‘political pariah’ of its 
time – privatized its public pension system in 1981, pension privatization has also become a standard 
example of international policy diffusion. If there is disagreement it is about why and how diffusion 
happened rather than whether it happened.2 Initially, private pensions were supposed to enhance 
growth, minimize political risks and reduce budget deficits in the long run, while at the same time 
efficiently providing income for the elderly. In the 1990s and 2000s, financial lobbies, international 
organizations and epistemological communities argued heavily for their introduction.3 In countries 
in which the domestic political constellation was permissive, and the costs of transition not too high, 
private pension systems were introduced.4 
Most of these approaches assume that the privatization of pensions is irreversible. Adoption 
is equated with a paradigmatic and lasting political change. Yet, recent events show that diffusion 
might have gone too far. Some countries have become new pariahs, by fully or partially reversing 
the privatization of pension systems. Figure 1 gives a stylized impression of the long increase and 
sudden reversal of pension privatization. At least four countries – Argentina, Bolivia, Hungary, and 
Kazakhstan – have implemented major reversals, abolishing the private scheme, and nationalizing a 
large part of the accumulated assets. Below this surface of complete reversals, other countries followed 
with partial reforms. For instance, a large group of countries has partly or temporarily re-channeled 
contributions from the private to the public pillar.5 
1 Robert Holzmann, ”Global Pension Systems and Their Reform: Worldwide Drivers, Trends, and Challenges,” IZA Discussion 
Papers No. 6800 (2012), Estelle James and Sarah Brooks, ”The Political Economy of Structural Pension Reform,” in New Ideas 
About Old Age Security, ed. Robert Holzmann and J. E. Stiglitz (Washington: World Bank, 2001).
2 Sarah Brooks, ”Interdependent and Domestic Foundations of Policy Change: The Diffusion of Pension Privatization around 
the World,” International Studies Quarterly 49 (2005), Katharina Müller, The Political Economy of Pension Reform in Central-
Eastern Europe (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999). Michael Orenstein, Privatizing Pensions. The Transnational Campaign for 
Social Security Reform (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), Kurt Weyland, ”Theories of Policy Diffusion: Lessons 
from Latin American Pension Reform,” World Politics 57, no. 2 (2005).
3 M. Leimgruber, ”The Historical Roots of a Diffusion Process: The Three-Pillar Doctrine and European Pension Debates, 1972-
1994,” Global Social Policy 12, no. 1 (2012). Marek Naczyk, ”Agents of Privatization? Business Groups and the Rise of Pension 
Funds in Continental Europe,” Socio-Economic Review 11, no. 3 (2013).
4 Giuliano Bonoli, The Politics of Pension Reform. Institutions and Policy Change in Western Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). Ellen M. Immergut, Karen M. Anderson, and Isabelle Schulze, eds., The Handbook of West European 
Pension Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), John Myles and Paul Pierson, ”The Comparative Political Economy 
of Pension Reform,” in The New Politics of the Welfare State, ed. Paul Pierson (New York: 2001).
5 Jan Drahokoupil and Stefan Domonkos, ”Averting the Funding-Gap Crisis: East European Pension Reforms after 2008,” 
Global Social Policy 12, no. 3 (2012).
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Figure 1: The global spread and recent dip in privatizing pensions
Source: own graph, see section 3 for details.
Even if drastic reversals are still relatively rare, they tell an important story: the stability of political 
outcomes in pension politics cannot be taken for granted, especially not in developing countries. The 
informal handbook for the diffusion of private pension schemes, the World Bank’s “Averting the Old 
Age Crisis”6, was an attempt to reconcile positive and normative tradeoffs in a mixed system in which 
public pensions should avoid excessive inequities, whereas private pensions should unleash growth 
and productivity. The multi-pillar system should lead to fewer political risks, smaller fiscal deficits and 
more growth. The reversals are strong reminders that these promises have not materialized, at least not 
everywhere.7 
A particularly striking example is the idea that the privatization of pensions should spur growth of 
capital markets. To the contrary, we will see that rather than a consequence of pension reform, capital 
markets are a political and economic prerequisite for private pension systems. Where these prerequisites 
are missing governments often did not even try to introduce private pension systems. Where, however, 
international diffusion led governments to introduce these systems, the introduction was done on shaky 
grounds and in several cases has led to severe backlashes. 
In particular, I will show that the dangerous combination of high levels of debt with weak financial 
markets provided a new type of political risk which, under certain circumstances, gives governments 
incentives to re-nationalize the private pension scheme. If governments did not manage to bring public 
debt down, but assets in private pension schemes started accumulating they became attractive sources 
6 World-Bank, Averting the Old Age Crisis, A World Bank Policy Research Report (Washington: World Bank Group, 1994).
7 Carmelo Mesa-Lago, ”Myth and Reality of Pension Reform: The Latin American Evidence,” World Development 30, no. 8 
(2002), Peter R. Orszag and Joseph E. Stiglitz, ”Rethinking Pension Reform: Ten Myths About Social Security Systems” (paper 
presented at the New Ideas About Old Age Security, Washington (D.C.), September 14-15, 1999 1999).
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of public revenue. Where the political system allowed for strong majorities such as in Hungary, the 
result was a full reversal, i.e. the seizing all the assets; where political competition was stronger, such as 
in the Slovak Republic, governments could not get hold of the assets, but made changes at the margin, 
such as re-diverting contributions.
Hence, the recent reversals of pension privatization hold broader lessons in store. We see that 
diffusion can ‘over-shoot’ and make developing countries adopt new policies even if they don’t dispose 
of the structural prerequisites to do so. In the short run, pension privatization was clearly also about 
international policy diffusion, policy learning and in some cases even about overselling. In the long 
run, however, political and economic fundamentals may reverse some of this ‘overshooting’, especially 
in developing countries which lack the basis for these changes. The final outcome in these cases might 
be harmful both economically and politically. 
In the following, I first take stock of the scholarly literature explaining the rise of privatized pension. 
In section three, I will look at recent cases of reversing privatization and how these reversals square with 
the scholarly literature. From this I develop the argument that in cases in which adoption of private 
pensions did not have the political and economic prerequisites reversals are likely. To show this I will use 
a mixed-methods design. In the fourth section, I will explore the determinants of the long-run stability 
of private pension systems for a sample of around 60 countries over more than 30 years. The results 
show that private pension systems are more likely in countries with lower public debt, stronger capital 
markets and higher exposure to diffusion factors. In section five, I compare four countries to discover 
the causal mechanisms underlying the results of the quantitative analysis. The analysis matches cases of 
stability with cases of reversals, using the quantitative results as tool for case selection. The different fate 
of the Chilean and Hungarian systems shows the relevance of debt and mature financial markets for the 
stability of the systems. A comparison of Uruguay and the Slovak Republic reveals a similar difference, 
but on a more incremental level, as the smaller electoral margins only gave rise to smaller reversals in 
the Slovak case. The final section concludes with broader lessons for the diffusion of pension reforms.
2 .  T H E  P E N D U L U M  S W I N G S  ‘ R I G H T ’ :  H O W  TO  E X P L A I N  T H E  T R E N D 
TO WA R D S  P R I V AT I Z AT I O N
The introduction of private pensions can mean several things. Some countries such as Chile completely 
abolished the public system, whereas Argentina or Hungary put in place the new system in addition to 
the public scheme. The private pension schemes can differ in several ways, but they have in common 
that they are based on funded, defined-contribution accounts. For some authors ‘private pensions’ mean 
individual as opposed to collective accounts, for others mandatory as opposed to voluntary systems. The 
World Bank defines private pension systems as ‘mandatory personal retirement accounts’ (Holzmann 
2012). According to this definition the total number of countries having (partly) shifted to a private 
pension scheme is 38.8 
8 Sarah Brooks, ”Social Protection and Economic Integration,” Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 5 (2002), Holzmann, ”Global 
Pension Systems and Their Reform: Worldwide Drivers, Trends, and Challenges.”, Michael Orenstein, ”Pension Privatization: 
Evolution of a Paradigm,” Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 26, no. 2 (2013). 
Figure 1 uses this definition, but for a reduced sample because of missing values.
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What makes countries introduce private pension schemes? Early economic contributions focused 
on three main advantages of privatization as drivers for reform: First, whereas public systems were 
exposed to the danger of politicians intervening, and, in the worst of all cases, depleting the assets of 
the public system, a private system should be immune against political risk. Instead private systems 
were organized by the market, and exposed to market risks only. Second, public systems were argued 
to lead to economic disincentives and create large public deficits. A private, individual system, in turn, 
would transfer the decision of how much to save to the individual and reduce public deficits. Third, this 
correspondence should also enhance savings and, in more general, efficiency. More savings should lead 
to a deepening of financial markets, and this should eventually lead to more growth.
This early optimism was soon questioned along all three fronts: private pensions can lead to 
political risks; deficits may increase; growth may be sluggish. As the actual performance of private 
pensions seems an ambivalent motive for the privatization of pensions, political scientists have looked 
for other explanations. On the side of domestic politics, John Myles and Paul Pierson9 have famously 
argued that legacies play a strong role, so that mature systems would introduce private pensions more 
reluctantly.10 Another form of restrictions comes through political institutions affecting the likelihood 
of reforms.11 Voting systems and the polarization or distribution of voters will affect the likelihood of 
reform. Demographic change may tip the political balance against a parametric reform.12  In contrast, 
special-interest groups push for privatization. Financial-service companies gain from a privatization 
and should lobby for its introduction.13 Politicians who want to attract foreign capital and to spur 
financial markets will support their cause.14 According to this logic pension reform should precede the 
growth of capital and financial markets. 
Other authors explain the rise of private pensions with international politics. Some authors found 
evidence for a logic of imposition: pension privatization was often part of conditionality imposed by 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.15  Adoption of private pensions can also be the 
result of competition or policy learning. Sarah Brooks, for instance, shows that the spread of private 
pensions is clearly nonlinear and contingent on the number of adopters in a region.16 Some authors put 
more emphasize on ‘softer’ forms of learning and interaction such as learning or networking. Michael 
9 Myles and Pierson, ”The Comparative Political Economy of Pension Reform.”
10 Sarah Brooks, ”When Does Diffusion Matter? Explaining the Spread of Structural Pension Reforms across Nations,” The Journal 
of Politics 69, no. 3 (2007), Emanuel Coman, ”Notionally Defined Contributions or Private Accounts. A Reconsideration of a 
Consecrated Argument on Pension Reform,” Comparative Political Studies 44, no. 7 (2011).
11 Bonoli, The Politics of Pension Reform. Institutions and Policy Change in Western Europe, Immergut, Anderson, and Schulze, 
eds., The Handbook of West European Pension Politics, Raul Madrid, ”The Politics and Economics of Pension Reform in Latin 
America,” Latin American Research Review 37, no. 2 (2002).
12 Hans-Werner  Sinn and Silke  Übelmesser, ”Pensions and the Path to Gerontocracy in Germany,” European Journal of Political 
Economy 19 (2002), Markus Tepe and Pieter Vanhuysse, ”Are Aging Oecd Welfare States on the Path to Gerontocracy?,” Journal 
of Public Policy 29, no. 1 (2009).
13 Author; James and Brooks, ”The Political Economy of Structural Pension Reform.”
14 Naczyk, ”Agents of Privatization? Business Groups and the Rise of Pension Funds in Continental Europe.”
15 Brooks, ”Interdependent and Domestic Foundations of Policy Change: The Diffusion of Pension Privatization around the 
World.”, Katharina Müller, Privatizing Old Age Security: Latin America and Eastern Europe Compared. (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2003).
16 Brooks, ”Interdependent and Domestic Foundations of Policy Change: The Diffusion of Pension Privatization around the 
World.”
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Orenstein puts emphasis on the World Bank’s leading role as a policy entrepreneur.17 Kurt Weyland 
argues that the patterns of diffusion are not compatible with any rational form of learning, but rather 
point to processes of bounded and biased forms of learning.18 In small circles of technocrats cognitive 
biases can arise, and people may anchor their belief around an often arbitrary or erroneous piece 
of information. Finally, newer contributions, highlight the conditioning of diffusion effects on the 
domestic political context and the political alternatives such as other types of pension reforms.19
3 .  T H E  P E N D U L U M  S W I N G S  ‘ L E F T ’ :  T H E  T H E O R E T I C A L  I M P L I C AT I O N S  O F 
R E C E N T  R E V E R S A L S
In 2008, the Argentine government decided to fully reverse pension privatization, the de facto abolition 
of the private pension scheme. Hungary and Bolivia followed in 2010, Kazakhstan in 2012 and Poland 
(in 2014) and Russia seem on the same path. Other countries introduced partial reversals, particularly 
after the global financial crisis. Poland (in 2011) and Estonia, for instance, (temporarily) channeled 
the lion’s share of contribution back into the public system.20 Finally, those countries that were only in 
the process of implementing a reform, such as Bulgaria and Romania, put the transition on halt. Even 
in cases where private pensions where still introduced such as in the Czech Republic, the reform was 
quickly withdrawn.21
How do the theories mentioned above cope with this new information – the reversibility of 
reforms and the partial ‘unlearning’, breaking away from the crowd? Much of the comparative and 
international literature seems to have taken the irreversibility for granted: they have equated reforms 
with lasting political change. As a consequence, they are stronger in explaining why and where the 
privatization happens then how long it lasts. Take the example of the diffusion literature. Why do these 
countries become pariahs and decide to break away? The reversibility implies that (as figure 1 shows) 
that policy areas may not always follow the iconic S-shape that is commonly and sometimes erroneously 
equated with diffusion.22 More substantively, reversibility has consequences for the explanatory power 
of some of the causal mechanisms of diffusion. For instance, the literature argued that the international 
financial institutions can coax countries into reforms with the help of conditional loans. Yet, both 
Argentina and Hungary have used the money raised by nationalizing pensions to keep the international 
financial institutions at bay. Hence, the political leverage of international financial institution seems to 
hold only up to a limit. Beyond this limit, the reversal makes countries less dependent from conditional 
loans. 
17 Orenstein, Privatizing Pensions. The Transnational Campaign for Social Security Reform.
18 Weyland, ”Theories of Policy Diffusion: Lessons from Latin American Pension Reform.”
19 See Brooks, ”When Does Diffusion Matter? Explaining the Spread of Structural Pension Reforms across Nations.”
20 Drahokoupil and Domonkos, ”Averting the Funding-Gap Crisis: East European Pension Reforms after 2008.”
21 OECD, ”Pensions at a Glance 2013,” (Paris: OECD, 2013).
22 In fact, many processes unrelated to diffusion can yield an S-curve. Imagine the case in which all countries react to a common 
international shock, but the speed of adaption is normally distributed. Author, Craig Volden, Michael M. Ting, and Daniel P. 
Carpenter, ”A Formal Model of Learning and Policy Diffusion,” American Political Science Review 102, no. 3 (2008).
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How else have these reversals been explained? Some diffusion arguments also work for reversals. 
Orenstein points out that the World Bank began to withdraw from privatization in the early 2000s.23 
Nonetheless, the reversals often took place to make a statement against the international financial 
institutions. Approaches dealing with the socialization of elites also have limits. Take the example 
of Poland, where practically the same political parties, and the same individuals first pushed for the 
introduction of private pensions in the 1990s and, more recently, for the partial reversal.24 Reversals may 
also be the consequence of (non-)rational learning, for instance if politicians learn about the negative 
consequences. However, if cognitive biases and availability heuristics inform politicians’ choices, why 
do countries then break away? Why would the availability heuristics of Chilean technocrats have 
changed dramatically in 1981; or those of Hungarian politicians in 2010? 
Hence the focus of the question needs to shift from why countries adopt privatized pensions to why 
some countries run privatized pensions in the long-run whereas others re-nationalize them relatively 
quickly. In a nutshell it seems that while international policy diffusion goes a long way in explaining 
the rapid adoptions of private pension systems across the world, the domestic political economy pushed 
back in those cases where the context for privatization was not difficult. Arguably the best example 
is the idea that privatization would stimulate the growth of capital markets. However, for economic 
and, especially for political reasons capital markets are an important precondition for pension reforms. 
Financial market companies are important beneficiaries of private pension systems and lobby heavily 
for both the introduction and maintenance of private pension schemes. 
Other economic arguments for the privatization of pensions can also be turned ‘upside down’. 
Whereas private pensions were supposed to decrease budgetary pressure, the discussion about transition 
costs has shown that governments often increased fiscal pressures in the transitory phase. This is the 
famous problem of double financing pension reforms. As a consequence the reversals reinstate an 
older finding in the literature: Short-term costs can outweigh (uncertain) long-term gains. Note that 
debt-ridden governments may arrive in two ways at this result. Either the government anticipates the 
problem and does not privatize its pension system or it implements a privatization, but takes it back as 
the pressure from public debt is too high. In either case, the prediction is that the country will not run 
a private pension system in the long run.
Finally, the combination of (weak) capital markets and (high) public debt might have important 
political consequences. The privatization of pensions did not reduce the political risk of the state arbitrarily 
interfering in (private) pensions. Evidence from OECD countries shows that governments have heavily 
subsidized, ‘protected’ and rescued private pension systems.25 More importantly, government can also 
do the opposite, i.e. using private pension assets for public purposes. When is such interference more 
likely? Recent reversals show that such interference is likely if governments have incentives to use 
private pension fund assets to solve budgetary problems.26 This can only happen if pension funds are 
sufficiently large relative to public debt to be an attractive source of public revenue.
23 Orenstein, ”Pension Privatization: Evolution of a Paradigm.”
24 G. Rae, ”Poland’s Stalled Pension Reform. Paper Presente at the 9th Annual Espanet Conference, Valencia, 8th-10th, 2011,” 
(2011).
25 Paul Bridgen and Traute Meyer, ”The Politics of Occupational Pension Reform in Britain and the Netherlands: The Power of 
Market Discipline in Liberal and Corporatist Regimes,” West European Politics 32, no. 3 (2009).
26 Stephen Kay, ”Political Risk and Pension Privatization: The Case of Argentina (1994-2008),” International Social Security 
Review 62, no. 3 (2009), Mesa-Lago, ”Myth and Reality of Pension Reform: The Latin American Evidence.”
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Political risk of asset seizure will hence rise with public debt and the accumulated assets. Only 
in countries with very large pension funds, capital markets are politically powerful and one should 
expect a private pension system to be stable in the long run. Alternatively, countries with very high 
levels of public debt should have never even adopted private systems. Yet, the interaction between the 
two reveals the political opportunity costs of maintaining with a private pension system. If the asset-to-
debt ratio is relatively high, politicians might be tempted to solve budgetary problems with the help of 
pension assets. In a sense, the ratio can be interpreted as a proxy measure of political risk.
All in all, we would expect countries to run a private pension system when public debt is under 
control, the economy is growing, capital markets are strong and hence governments have little incentives 
to alter the system. However, we know from the literature that often international factors, for instance 
peer pressure from neighbors or the international financial institutions have clearly increased the odds 
of running a private pension system even in cases where these political and economic fundamentals 
were not given. In such cases, reversals will be likely.
The reversals show that there are complicated dynamics at play: some countries might never 
implement a privatization, whereas others ‘experiment with privatization’, only to take it back. For these 
reasons, the following sections use a mixed-methods design to test the arguments in two steps. First, the 
next section looks at the long-run predictions only: is a country likely to run a private pension system 
or not? This part will show the importance of many diffusion factors pushing for privatization, whereas 
high debt and low market capitalization pushed against it. In the next step, the regression results are 
used as the basis for selecting for countries to be inspected in a controlled qualitative comparison. 
The qualitative evidence can reveal the dynamics of pension politics better, and also reveals the causal 
mechanism underlying the quantitative results. We will see that domestic political and economic factors 
were crucial in explaining the difference between maintenance and reversal of pension privatization in 
these cases.
4 .  Q U A N T I TAT I V E  E V I D E N C E :  E X P L A I N I N G  L A S T I N G  R E F O R M S
For the quantitative tests, I collected macro-level data for some 60 countries between 1980 and 
2012. The sampling frame follows Brooks27 and covers mainly those (Latin) American and European 
countries which had a sizeable public pension scheme around 1980, the moment when Chile triggered 
the privatization process. The dependent variable measures whether a country in a given year runs a 
mandatory private pension scheme (1) or not (0). The private pillar can partially or completely replace 
the public pension pillar with mandatory private, individual pension accounts.28 As a robustness check, 
a second dependent variable also includes voluntary private schemes as long as these are supported by a 
27 Brooks, ”Social Protection and Economic Integration.”
28 Bernhard Ebbinghaus, ed., Varieties of Pension Governance. Pension Privatization in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011), Orenstein, ”Pension Privatization: Evolution of a Paradigm.”
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considerable tax subsidy.29 The definitions allow for reversals. I count as instances of reversals those in 
which a country has abolished or drastically reduced the private pillar. 
Moving on to the key independent variables, market capitalization is the logarithm of stock market 
capitalization in percent of GDP. Debt is defined as the logarithm of general government gross debt in 
percent of GDP.  Ratio is the ratio of market capitalization and debt. This variable proxies the political 
risk of a private pension scheme, and is calculated as the interaction between the previous two variables. 
It is important to note that market capitalization serves as a proxy variable for the size of private pension 
assets as there is no reliable information about pension fund assets over time.30 
Table A-1 shows the descriptive statistics for these variables. It also reports information on the 
control variables. Following the literature in comparative political economy these are: growth, measured 
as the moving average of the last five years; gdp, the log of GDP; elderly as the share of people above 65; 
service as the share of service-sector employment; left-right partisanship of the government; government 
majority as the difference in the vote share of the two largest parties; veto as the number of veto points; 
enpp as the effective number of parties; and Polity IV’s index of democracy. 
Compared to this the international factors are by and large expected to increase the odds for a 
private pension system. The controls for international factors are: trade in percent of GDP; outstanding 
World-Bank loans in percent of GDP; the number of regional peers, i.e. the percentage of transition and 
Latin American economies that have already adopted a private pension system. Finally, the table shows 
four different variables to measure spatial diffusion. These variables are spatial lags using four different 
weights: y_dist uses inverse geographic distances; y_dist_sd is similar to y_dist but the weights are row-
standardized; y_cont uses a contiguity matrix; y_cont_sd is similar to y_cont but the weights are again 
row-standardized. Similar to Plümper and Neumayer31 I experimented with several different spatial 
lags. The results only report those with strongest results which happen to be spatial lags with weights 
using row-standardized inverse distances.
Table 1 presents the results of pooled cross-section regressions. The models are logit regressions 
with either a (logarithmic) time trend or a battery of time dummies.32 The standard errors are clustered 
for countries. The models use the spatial lag to account for cross-sectional correlation.33 To reduce 
the problem of endogeneity, the model uses the spatial lag at time t-1. Similarly, the key independent 
variables market capitalization, debt and ratio are lagged variables. Table 1 shows the results. The first 
model of table 1 includes a smaller subsample of control variables plus year dummies. The second 
model includes all control variables plus year dummies. The third model replaces the year dummies 
with a logarithmic trend in time.
29 OECD, ”Pensions at a Glance 2013.” An example would be the German ‘Riester’ reform of 2001. Initially the reform implied 
the introduction of mandatory private pensions. Severe political pressure made the government choose a more costly alternative 
in the form of a voluntary system with a sizeable tax incentive.
30 The correlation for the size of pension assets according to OECD pension statistics and market capitalization is for 30 countries 
in 2010 is 0.75.
31 Thomas Pluemper and Eric Neumayer, ”Model Specification in the Analysis of Spatial Dependence,” European Journal of 
Political Research 49 (2010).
32 Nathaniel Beck, Jonathan Katz, and Richard Tucker, ”Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary 
Dependent Variable,” American Journal of Political Science 42, no. 4 (1998).
33 Robert Franzese and Jude Hays, ”Empirical Models of International Capital-Tax Competition,” in International Taxation 
Handbook, ed. G. Gregoriou and C. Read (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007).
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Table 1: Regression results for the privatization of pension systems 
(1) (2) (3)
debt (t-1) -3.081*** -5.229*** -4.331***
[1.240] [1.363] [1.233]
stock market (t-1) 1.921*** 2.307*** 2.341***
[0.841] [0.929] [0.871]
ratio (t-1) -4.419*** -6.642*** -6.233***
[2.119] [2.605] [2.340]
growth 1.515 -10.79 -3.834
[13.967] [14.170] [14.253]
gdp p.c. -0.0509 -0.0837 -0.0859
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
gdp 0.134 0.352* 0.281
[0.141] [0.185] [0.188]
pop65 0.308* 0.444*** 0.377***
[0.157] [0.167] [0.145]
service 0.101 0.160*** 0.137***
[0.062] [0.063] [0.057]
veto 0.174 0.259 0.196
[0.242] [0.241] [0.266]
majority 2.287 2.930 2.489
[2.232] [2.380] [2.608]
enpp -0.0571 0.0165 0.0298
[0.192] [0.215] [0.036]
transition peers 0.238* 0.377*** 0.344***
[0.129] [0.138] [0.143]
Latin peers 0.567*** 0.860*** 0.717***
[0.183] [0.209] [0.198]
y_dist_sd(t-1) -9.454*** -18.25*** -8.106***
[4.408] [4.480] [2.332]
trade -0.00463 -0.00144
[0.010] [0.010]
loans 46.49*** 43.44***
[16.248] [15.991]
partisanship -0.312 -0.234
[0.194] [0.185]
democracy 1.208*** 1.032***
[0.434] [0.431]
year 306.4***
[138.924]
_cons -7.520 -21.32*** -2346.4***
[6.110] [8.374] [1052.462]
N 783 714 714
pseudo R2 0.351 0.486 0.434
ll -342.9 -248.5 -273.9
chi2 341.1 9263.2 121.9
Notes: only models (2) and (3) use lagged independent variables; z-scores in parentheses; levels of significance * < .1, ** < .05, 
*** <.01; clustered standard errors; time effects in models (1) and (2) omitted.
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The second column of table 1 contains the results of a model with a full battery of year dummies. 
The signs for the first three variables follow the expected pattern. Market capitalization, has a positive 
effect on pension reforms. It is clear that countries cannot simply ‘jump start’ their financial markets by 
adopting a private pension system. Rather, the finding supports claims about the strong role of financial 
markets in privatizing pensions.34 Higher levels of debt reduce the likelihood of a country to have a 
private pension scheme. This would be true for models without the interaction term, and not only the 
consequence of a lower-order coefficient.35 Hence, the finding shows that financial constraints reduce 
the odds of having a private pension system which would ‘stand the test of time’. 
As the third variable, ratio, shows the interaction effect is negative, i.e. the higher the ratio between 
market capitalization and debt the less likely a country is to have a private pension system. This interaction 
effect is best portrayed with the help of  Figure 2.36  The figure shows a curvilinear relationship between 
with the effect of public debt being contingent on the size of market capitalization. For ease of exposition 
the lower panel of the figure shows the frequency distribution of market capitalization. We see that the 
probability of a private pension system is lowest for levels of market capitalization around the median. As 
expected, debt always reduces the probability of running a private pension scheme, but the probability 
increases towards both ends of market capitalization. This implies that higher assets-to-debt ratios make 
it less likely to have a private pillar, unless the assets become truly large. Due to the lower number of 
cases for very high levels of market capitalization, the confidence intervals are very big on the right-hand 
side of the graph. All in all, however, the graph confirms the idea that the combination of debt and asset 
plays an important role in the long-run stability of a private pension system. 
Figure 2: Interaction of Stock Market Capitalization and Debt Levels
34 As a supplementary test I used the number of people employed in financial services instead of market capitalization. It is only 
available for OECD countries, but the effect on the probability of a private pension is even stronger.
35 Thomas Brambor, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder, ”Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical 
Analyses,” Political Analysis 14 (2006).
36 The calculation use stata’s margin command, version 12.0 Richard Williams, ”Using the Margins Command to Estimate and 
Interpret Adjusted Predictions and Marginal Effects,” The Stata Journal 12, no. 2 (2012).
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Turning to the control variables exhibits mixed findings. The level of growth in the previous five 
years does not tip the balance in one direction or the other. Auxiliary regressions show that this is a 
consistent finding for alternative model specifications (see table A-2). Unsurprisingly, the likelihood of 
privatized pensions increases with problem pressure expressed through higher percentages of the elderly 
in the population. More interesting is the fact that the likelihood of a private pension system also 
increases with the size of the service sector. This might imply that societies which undergo structural 
change undertake all kinds of reform activities, ranging from introducing social non-contributory (see 
Carnes and Mares fc.) to private pensions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the domestic politics is less visible 
than in studies that focus on the introduction of private pensions. The only variable which shows a 
significant and positive effect is democracy. This is an interesting finding in itself, as several of the most 
important cases of reversal are also cases in which democracy seems to be regressing. 
International variables do show visible effects. For instance, loans from the World Bank make 
private pensions more likely.37 Trade as percentage to GDP does not seem to influence pension 
privatization much. I also experimented with capital flows in the form of inward foreign direct 
investment or capital inflows, but the results where unconvincing. The peer variables, especially the 
number of Latin American countries do confirm previous studies on the adoption of pension systems, 
and the adoption of other innovations in social protection. The spatial lag yields a negative sign. This 
is similar to other studies,38 and might be due to a competition logic: a country might implement a 
pension reform as a signal to international capital markets to lure in capital from neighbors. There is 
some debate as to whether this result is reasonable, but a similar case has been made for other policy 
areas such as labor market or tax policies.39 
All things considered diffusion factors by and large push for running a private pension system in 
the long run, whereas high public debt and weak capital markets push against this. The major findings 
of model (1) are robust to several changes in the specification. Model (2) includes a larger battery of 
control variables. The effects for the diffusion variables and the key politico-economic variables become 
stronger rather than weaker. A model with a time trend instead of the year fixed effects does not affect 
the results of table 1 either. The appendix lists further tests. Slightly changing the definition of reforms 
does not affect the results strongly. For instance, if I expand the definition of ‘private pensions’ to 
include also voluntary, tax-subsidized systems the results are very similar (table A-2, model (3)).  The 
same goes for tests with sub-samples either excluding entire regions (table A-2, model(1)) or countries 
on a case-by-case basis (table A-2, model(2)).
37 However, the effect might be inflated due to the large number of countries not receiving any loans.
38 Brooks, ”When Does Diffusion Matter? Explaining the Spread of Structural Pension Reforms across Nations.”
39 Franzese and Hays, ”Empirical Models of International Capital-Tax Competition.” Author.
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5 .  Q U A L I TAT I V E  E V I D E N C E :  W H E N  A N D  W H Y  C O U N T R I E S  R E V E R S E  T H E 
R E F O R M S
The quantitative models yield long-run predictions about whether or not a country has a private pension 
scheme in the long run. These models have several limits. First, they do not deal with the dynamics, and 
especially not those cases in which reversals happened. Second, there is a lot of heterogeneity in private 
pension systems – e.g. differences in coverage and generosity – which the regressions cannot easily 
capture. Third, they also do not justice for the complex role of past decisions and the institutional legacies 
these create. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, they do not fully reveal the causal mechanisms of 
the macro-aggregate correlates. For these reasons, this section narrates the political and dynamics in 
two pairs of countries: Chile vs. Hungary and Uruguay vs. the Slovak Republic. In both pairs, the first 
country has seen stability in the private pension scheme, whereas the second country has experienced 
reversals. Whereas Chile vs. Hungary exemplifies radical solutions, Slovakia vs. Uruguay shows smaller, 
more incremental changes. 
We will see that the dynamics of debt and capital markets go a long way in explaining the difference 
between stability and instability. We will see that the evolution of debt and capital markets stabilized 
systems in Chile and Uruguay, but clearly increased pressure in Slovak Republic and Hungary. The 
size of the reversals, however, also depended on the degree of political competition between major 
political factions. Whereas the political system allowed for a big swing in Hungary, the Slovak Republic 
often produces unstable multi-party coalition governments. In the Slovak case, we also see instances of 
reversal, but of much smaller scope, focusing on contribution rates rather than the accumulated assets.
The case selection is summarized in table 3. It is important to discuss this case selection in light of 
the results of the quantitative model. With some degree of exaggeration, one can argue that the model 
predicts Slovakia and Chile well, whereas it does worse for Hungary and Uruguay.40 Hungary lies above 
the regression line, i.e. the model overestimates the likelihood of a private pension scheme, whereas for 
Uruguay the opposite holds true. One of the reasons for these errors lies in the very coarse 1/0 definition 
of the dependent variable. The defining characteristics of private schemes are very diverse and differ in 
such important terms as coverage or eligibility. Correspondingly, reforms of these private systems are 
equally diverse. The qualitative analysis can increase the level of detail to show the differences in the 
scope of the reforms. 
Another interpretation is that the reversal in Hungary will bring the country back to ‘equilibrium’ 
in terms of the quantitative results. Hence, the quantitative models help to derive some expectations 
while they also control some of the alternative explanations for the case comparisons. Matching Hungary 
40 A look at table A-1 shows this. The table shows the predicted probabilities of private pension system in each country, and 
compares them to the amount of time in the last 30 years, the country really ran such a system. Chile comes much closer to the 
actual amount of time, than Uruguay.
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to Chile and Uruguay to Slovakia is clearly imperfect, but it reduces the relevance of other explanations. 
In this sense, the case selection follows the logic of a controlled comparison.41 It is motivated not 
only by variation in the key independent variables, but also the controls.42 Uruguay and Slovakia, in 
particular deliver very similar predictions according to the model (1) in table 1, in both cases very low.43 
The predicted probabilities for the comparison between Hungary and Chile are further apart, but in 
both cases the model predicts a private pension scheme. The qualitative comparisons can identify those 
factors which drive these cases apart.
The controlled comparisons proceed as follows: In each case I will start with a brief description of 
the stability and changes of the pension system. Then, I will proceed to the key independent variables, 
debt and the size of the pension assets/ strength of capital markets. Next, I will move on to political 
factors such as the electoral competition and their role in the evolution of the pension system. Finally, I 
will briefly come back to international factors and policy diffusion to see their role in the four countries.
Table 3: Stability and Size of Outcomes 
Size of Reforms
small large
Stability of Reforms
stable Uruguay (0.22) Chile (0.89)
unstable Slovak Republic (0.23) Hungary (0.70)
Based on the predicted probabilities of model (1) in table 1; see also table A-3 in the appendix.
Big Reforms in Chile and Hungary
The comparison of Chile and Hungary reveals the difference between a very mature and politically 
powerful financial market vs. a vulnerable private pension system in a debt-ridden country and 
considerable political dynamics. 
Chile’s 1980/1 reform is still one the most drastic case of privatization in the pension system. The 
reform practically abolished the public pillar and subsidized the transition to the private pillar with 
transfers between five and eight percent of GDP per annum. Even if Chile became later on the role 
model of pension reform, it has well-known deficiencies such as high administrative costs and limited 
returns.44 After 1981, discontent with the pension system arose with the low coverage rates, and the 
huge problems of old-age poverty. 
However, the system remained remarkably stable over time. After the political transition, the 
newly formed centre-left governments did try to change the 2nd pillar, but most changes took place in 
the form of additions to the systems, rather than reversals. The most conspicuous of these additions 
was the introduction of a basic non-contributory pension system in 2008 complementing the earnings-
related private pension system. 
41 Jason Seawright and John Gerring, ”Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative 
Options,” Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (2008).
42 Thomas Plümper, Vera Troeger, and Eric Neumayer, ”Case Selection and Causal Inference in Qualitative Research,” British 
Journal of Political Science (fc.).
43 The predicted probabilities for this model are listed in appendix table 2.
44 Mesa-Lago, ”Myth and Reality of Pension Reform: The Latin American Evidence.”
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The evolution of debt and the importance of the financial markets go a long way in explaining 
the maintenance of the 2nd pillar. Chilean public debt fell drastically to less than 10 percent of GDP 
in recent years. With the decline in public debt, a prime motive of reversal, revenue shortage, subsided. 
Moreover, the 1980/1 reform founded pension funds which grew up to 67 percent of GDP in 2010. This 
lay the basis for the political strength of private pensions. Just as an example, over 19,000 salespeople 
operated the private pension system on the ground, and financial-service companies greatly benefited 
from the established accounts.45 Even after the political transition, both contributors and financial 
market agents had powerful advocates in parliament, mainly among right-wing pro-Pinochet parties.46
Political competition also plays an important role in explaining the stability. It is not very surprising 
that a military dictatorship can ‘sit out’ the hardships of the funding gap which haunts the transition 
from public to private systems. More interesting, however, is the period after the political transition. 
So far, incoming centre-left governments could not change the status quo radically. On the one hand, 
the governments of the Concertación were very heterogeneous coalitions of major democratic anti-
Pinochet parties, with internal divisions about the question of pension reforms. On the other hand, the 
political competition from the pro-Pinochet parties guaranteed that government majorities were not 
large and stable enough to guarantee big changes. When, for instance, the first Bachelet government 
tried to increase the regulation of private pension funds, the strong opposition from business-oriented 
pro-Pinochet parties in the senate proved enough to veto the bill.47 Instead, left governments sought to 
complement the private pension system with a non-contributory minimum pension scheme rather than 
to abolish it. In doing so, Chile follows a more general pattern of policy diffusion in this area.
In many senses, Hungary is the opposite case of Chile. The private pension scheme never 
completely stabilized, and was abruptly taken down in 2010. When Hungary introduced its pension 
system in 1998, it was based on a compromise of a left-liberal coalition government.48 The outcome 
was a reform less radical than in Chile, but it still channeled one third of all contributions from the 
public into the new private pension scheme. Till 1998 and 2010 there were swings back and forth 
in which conservative governments halted the growing contributions to the private system and left-
liberal governments increased the contributions to the private system. Eventually, the second FIDESZ 
government practically renationalized the private pension system. This resulted in the overwhelming 
majority moving back not only with their monthly transfers, but all the accumulated assets into the 
public pillar.49 
The dynamics between debt and asset accumulation in the pension funds plays a considerable 
part in explaining the ultimate reversal. The 1998 reform produced a mixed public private system 
with huge transitory problems. The reforms contributed massively to the rise of public debt, as young 
contributors left the public system, and the deficit in the public scheme increased. Rising debt made 
45 Kay, ”Political Risk and Pension Privatization: The Case of Argentina (1994-2008).”
46 Jenny Pribble, Welfare and Party Politics in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
47 Ibid., p. 81.
48 Kristin Makszin, ”Reforming East Central European Welfare States. Governments, Technocrats, and the Patterns of Quiet 
Retrenchment” (CEU 2013).
49 Andras Simonovits, ”The Mandatory Private Pension Pillar in Hungary: An Orbituary,” International Social Security Review 64, 
no. 3 (2011).
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the assets accumulated in pension funds an interesting target similar to Argentina.50 At the time of the 
nationalization, assets were around 15 percent of GDP. 
Contrary to Chile, the pension funds, and the capital market in more general, were not deeply 
entrenched in Hungarian society. Although the 1998 reform was triggered by a business elite who 
wanted to strengthen the national capital market, the reform did not generate the expected growth 
effects. To the contrary, it was hampered by low growth and huge capital-market volatility in the late 
1990s and early 2000s .51 This may be one reason why the popularity of the new system rapidly declined 
in the 2000s.52  Another reason was that the majority of funds was administrated by foreign companies, 
which further weakened the legitimacy of the system (e.g. Financial Times 26th of July, 2010). Finally, 
from the very beginning of the private pension scheme, the Hungarian government heavily regulated 
the pension funds. Most importantly, pension funds had to invest most of their assets into public debt.
The timing and the size of the reversal depended on the political dynamics. The 1998 reform 
was pushed through by a heterogeneous coalition government with frequent changes in the cabinet. 
The majorities of government coalitions remained small and fragile so that policy changes could 
only be incremental. This changed when FIDESZ won a two-thirds majority in the parliament in 
2010 and quickly pushed through the necessary legislation. Nationalizing the equivalent of 15% of 
GDP allowed the government to adopt a ‘bullish’ stance against the European Commission and the 
International Monetary Fund. On the domestic level, the reversals decreased the need for immediate, 
unpopular fiscal retrenchment. Moreover, FIDESZ managed to pacify the middle classes by packaging 
the re-nationalization with the introduction of a flat income tax (Hungary Around the Clock, 13th 
of December, 2010). If the government learned from the Argentine case, it avoided making this 
public. Rather the opposition and international investors brandished the government for repeating the 
Argentine ‘nightmare’ (Bloomberg, 26th of November, 2010). 
Smaller Reforms in Slovak Republic and Uruguay
The comparison between the Slovak Republic and Uruguay shows the dangerous dynamics between 
rising debt and political instability in a more subtle form. The political conflict was largely fought 
over marginal changes, i.e. over transfers and not assets. Uruguay implemented a moderate, but very 
stable private scheme in the 1990s. At the time, levels of public debt were considerable. Yet, levels of 
public debt have declined over time and reduced the need for drastic reversals. In the Slovak Republic 
the evolution is reverse: public debt has risen over time, and contributions to the private pillar and the 
cumulative assets do represent an important ‘bargaining chip’ in the evolution of pension politics.
When Uruguay introduced its private system in 1995/6, this had almost no effect on the public 
pillar and public debt.53 The system introduced was mandatory so that coverage was relatively high, but 
the scope and transfers to the private scheme were much smaller than in Chile. In fact, the World Bank 
had lobbied for a much stricter implementation of the Chilean model, decreasing the importance of the 
50 There is little evidence, that Argentina’s example played a huge role in the 2010 reform. FIDESZ already attempted to abolish 
the 2nd pillar during its first term, but were afraid of the electoral consequences (Makszin 2013).
51 P. Antolin, ”Pension Fund Performance,” OECD Working Papers on Insurance and Private Pensions No. 20 (2008).
52 Bela Janky and Robert I. Gal, ”Public Opinion on Pension Systems in Europe,” ENEPRI Working Papers No. 36 (2007).
53  IEG, ”Pension Reform and the Development of Pension Systems: An Evaluation of World Bank Assistance,” in IEG Working 
Papers, ed. World Bank (Washington: World Bank Group, 2007).
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public pillar much more drastically, but the Sanguinetti administration opted for the more moderate 
mixed model. The system in place has proved remarkably stable over time. Recent reform activities 
concentrated on either more marginal issues or other forms of social assistance.54 
The dynamics of debt and accumulating assets was less pronounced than in Chile, but the overall 
direction was similar. Especially from the 2000s onwards public debt decreased drastically. At the same 
time, pension assets increased steadily and were in 2010 similar to those in Hungary. Hence, while 
the size of assets nowadays makes them more attractive, governments are under less fiscal pressure. In 
addition, even if the pension system did not create tremendous rates of returns were in the beginning, 
these increased considerably in the 2000s. This  may be one reason why public support for the pension 
system is relatively high compared to Latin American standards.55 Thus, while the capital markets are 
not politically as strong and deeply entrenched as in Chile, the support for the private pension seems 
large enough to maintain the status quo.
Model (1) in table 1 underestimates the existence and stability of the Uruguayan system to a certain 
degree. One, of the reasons, as argued above may be the differences in the dependent variable and the 
small scope of the initial pension reform. Another factor is again the role of electoral competition and 
the stability of the political system. There are three major parties in Uruguay which make landslide 
victories highly unlikely. The initial 1995/6 reform was implemented by a ‘grand coalition’ of the two 
traditional parties Colorados and Blancos. Subsequent elections increasingly strengthened a third party, 
the Frente Amplio. The Frente Amplio had rejected pension privatization in the 1990s, but even in 
office its majority was nowhere near to the results of the Hungarian election in 2010. Therefore, though 
the financial crisis of 2007 triggered a debate about the nationalization of private pensions this was not 
seriously considered.56 Similar to Chilean left governments, Frente Amplio aimed to complement the 
existing system and not to reverse it.
According to the results of model (1), the Slovak Republic should be very similar to Uruguay. 
Similar to Uruguay, the political system does not allow for big changes. Yet the dynamics of public 
debt and financial markets are less benign than in Uruguay. Hence, the instability in the Slovak 
private pension scheme found its way in the quarrels about contribution rates and not about the 
accumulated assets.
As a matter of fact, there is high instability in the Slovak private scheme. From the very beginning 
reforms were based on complicated compromises and every new incoming and politically opposite 
government tried to undo, whatever was done by its predecessor.57 After several failed attempts, it 
was the second government of Mikuláš Dzurinda which introduced a mandatory private pillar and 
channeled more than a third of the total contribution into the new system. With the elections of 2006, 
the political opposition came into office, and Robert Fico’s government tried to undo the privatization, 
by giving people the option to return into the public system. This reversal was, again, taken back, by 
a conservative government in 2010. When this government tumbled in 2012, the second government 
of Fico again reversed parts of the private system by reducing the contribution rate from 9% to 4%.58
54 Pribble, Welfare and Party Politics in Latin America.
55 See Carnes/ Mares (fc.)
56 Joshua Malnight, ”Coalitions, Institutions, and Nationalizations,” manuscript (2012).
57 Makszin, ”Reforming East Central European Welfare States. Governments, Technocrats, and the Patterns of Quiet 
Retrenchment”.
58 OECD, ”Pensions at a Glance 2013.”
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Contrary to Uruguay, the Slovak governments only managed to tame public debt till the global 
financial crisis of 2007, after which the level almost doubled from below 30 percent to more than 50 
percent of GDP.  As most of this debt is related to expenditure on old-age security, it still puts governments 
under strong pressure to reform the system. In this context, pension fund assets - though not much 
larger than in Uruguay (ca. 18 % of GDP in 2010) -, constitute an attractive political alternative to 
other forms of government revenue. There is little evidence for lobbying from vested interest.59 Financial 
markets have not reached the level which would give them the necessary political and economic status 
to play an important political role. There is ample evidence, however, that the World Bank and the 
epistemic community put their weight into the scale to push for the privatization of pensions.
One factor which strengthens the supporters of the private pension system is the moderately 
permissive consensus in public opinion to maintain the system. But even then the pressure from debt 
might have been enough, if it was not for the complicated political competition. The political dynamics 
created mostly fragile, politically heterogeneous coalition governments with small majorities. In this 
context, the reversals took place at the margin: changes in the rates of contributions to the private 
system, the optionality of the system, and ultimately in coverage rates.60
Comparing the four cases, it is clear that the political pressures from public debt increase the 
temptation to nationalize pensions as in Hungary and Slovakia. Where the private scheme was large 
and well entrenched it created a lobby strong enough to uphold it even against hostile governments. 
The paradigmatic case here is Chile. However, where the pension system was not strong enough, but 
constituted an attractive source of revenue for desperate governments, it was at risk. Hungary is the 
prime example. Compared to this the reforms in Uruguay and the Slovak Republic are much smaller. 
The evolution of public debt and financial markets differentiate these two countries, but the political 
systems, and especially the competition between political parties did not allow for radical changes. 
C O N C L U S I O N S :  D I D  T H E  D I F F U S I O N  O F  S O C I A L  P O L I C Y  G O  TO O  F A R ?
The recent reversals in pension politics hold important lessons for the evolution of social protection in 
developing countries. The quantitative evidence shows that whereas mainly international factors have 
pushed many countries to run private pension systems, the domestic political economy puts severe 
limits to these systems. The evidence suggests that rather than being the consequences of pension 
reform, structural fundamentals such as the strength of capital markets are a prerequisite for pension 
reform. Where privatization was nonetheless pushed through without these prerequisites, reversals are 
a likely consequence. This is especially true for situations in which debt levels increase, and the private 
system has accumulated some assets which could be used the public budget. Only in systems with very 
mature capital markets there is little evidence for this type of ‘political risk’. 
Nested into the quantitative results are four short case studies to reveal the underlying causal 
mechanisms explaining the stability or instability of private pension schemes. The qualitative evidence 
59 Miroslav Beblavý, ”The Political Economy of Comprehensive Social Policy Reform and Emergence of a Social Policy Paradigm: 
The Case of Slovakia,” (Bratislava: Slovak Governance Institute, 2007).
60 Makszin, ”Reforming East Central European Welfare States. Governments, Technocrats, and the Patterns of Quiet 
Retrenchment”.
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affirms that the existence of lobbying was fundamental for the maintenance of the Chilean and, to 
a lesser extent, also the Uruguayan system. The debt and capital market dynamics are less fortunate 
in Hungary and the Slovak Republic. What sets these two countries apart is the size of the reversal. 
Where the political system allows for big swings as in Hungary in 2010, the reform is drastic. In the 
Slovak Republic, the swings are still there, but much smaller, given the instability of the governments. 
Diffusion also matters in some of these cases, but arguably to a lesser degree than these political and 
economic factors.
Such a mixed methods design is not infallible. The quantitative analysis has clear limits. For instance, 
growth does not seem to matter very much, possibly because lack of growth undermines any type of 
system not only private pensions.61 Moreover, public support for private pension schemes clearly seems to 
differ across countries, but data constraints don’t allow for including this into the model. The case studies 
need to be short, and under-address some of the intricate details of the reform process and the outcomes. 
Despites these shortcomings, the article contains important lessons for the continuity and change 
of social protection in developing countries. The reversals did not come without social costs. People 
loose trust in the state’s capacity to organize old-age security. Moreover, implementing major pension 
reforms in a short period of time multiplies the transition costs. Ironically, this means that the Argentine 
and Hungarian pension system may accomplish very few of the major goals of social protection in the 
long run.  In this sense, it is important to understand the interplay between international diffusion and 
domestic politics much better.
The four cases imply that there is evidence for overshooting, greatly propelled by processes of 
international policy diffusion. The qualitative evidence suggests that pension reforms in which ‘outside’ 
influence from the World Bank or peers was stronger, even countries might have adopted private 
pension systems that do not really dispose of the necessary political and economic prerequisites: stable 
capital markets, sustainable government finance, and a stable and competitive political system. This 
does not bode well for a lot of developing countries in which these fundamentals are themselves highly 
unstable. In these societies, international or peer pressure could ultimately be counterproductive for the 
systems of social protection.
This is an important question for further research. On a theoretical level, the article suggests 
that different forms of policy learning should be combined to help our standing of policy change in 
social protection. In pension politics and related areas of the welfare state, psychological and ideational 
accounts have recently gained currency.62 By shifting from adoption to the maintenance of (un)stable 
policies, one can see that this is not necessarily a wrong, but perhaps incomplete approach. As the case 
of pension privatization has shown, there are strong ‘rational’ considerations of political economy that 
need to be factored in. Even if governments follow availability heuristics when they follow the ‘band 
wagon’, pressure piles up and make them vulnerable to reversals. A deeper understanding might be 
achieved by merging political-economy and cognitive accounts. The complex dynamics of different 
forms of learners is yet to be explored more fully, but they may explain instances of drastic and sudden 
policy reversals. Such a perspective also helps to understand why ‘pariahs’ occur and when they act as 
crystallizing points for future waves of international diffusion.
61 Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufmann, Development, Democracy, and Welfare States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2008).
62 Vivien A. Schmidt, ”Does Discourse Matter in the Politics of Welfare State Adjustment?,” Comparative Political Studies 35, 
no. 2 (2002), Barbara Vis and Kees van Kersbergen, ”Why and How Do Political Actors Pursue Political Reforms?,” Journal of 
Theoretical Politics 19, no. 2 (2007), Weyland, ”Theories of Policy Diffusion: Lessons from Latin American Pension Reform.”
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Appendix Table A-1: Variable Descriptions 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Source
Private Private Pension System  (1/0)
Brooks (2002), 
Holzmann (2012), 
Orenstein (2013), own
debt ln(general government gross debt in % of GDP) 3.744 0.699 IMF WEO 2013
market 
capitalization ln( market capitalization in % of GDP) WDI
ratio ratio of debt/stock markets 0.958 0.448 own
growth GDP growth (moving average of last 5 years) 0.033 0.028 WDI
gdp p.c. GDP p.c. 10162 10576 WDI
gdp ln(GDP) 26.619 2.471 WDI
elderly Population shave above 65 9.847 4.492 WDI
service service sector employment as % of total 59.521 12.529 WDI
unemployment unemployment rate 8.558 4.511 WDI
Political Constraints Henisz
partisanship left-right partisanship of government 1.117 1.224 Beck et al.
majority difference between government and largest opposition party 0.580 0.170 Beck et al.
veto Checks & Balances 3.822 1.423 Beck et al.
enpp Effective number of parties 3.999 8.549 Bormann/ Golder 
democracy polity2 score 4.583 6.999 Polity IV
icrg ICRG indicator of Quality of Government 0.655 0.233 Quality of Government, Gotheburg University
trade Trade in % of GDP 66.411 41.206 WDI
loans World Bank loans in % of GDP 0.011 0.029 WDI
peer No. of Countries with private system 9.019 11.595 own
transition peers No. of transition countries with private system 0.681 2.475 own
Latin peers No. of Latin American countries with private system 1.154 3.048 own
y_dist_sd spatial lag, weighted by inverse row-standardized distance 0.003 0.005 own, CEPII data
y_dist spatial lag, weighted by inverse distance 0.141 0.193 own, CEPII data
y_cont_sd spatial lag, weighted by contiguity row-standardized 0.141 0.275 own, CEPII data
y_dist spatial lag, weighted by contiguity 0.454 0.957 own, CEPII data
Note: own calculations.
A P P E N D I C E S
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Appendix Table A-2: Additional Model Specifications 
Without Latin America Jackknife Including voluntary schemes
debt (t-1) -5.800*** -4.229*** -2.680***
[1.600] [1.933] [1.127]
stock market (t-1) 3.451*** 2.472* 1.447***
[1.096] [1.330] [0.604]
ratio (t-1) -9.377*** -6.605* -4.548***
[2.832] [3.862] [1.901]
trade 0.0117 0.000870 0.00631
[0.015] [0.015] [0.009]
loans -28.82 34.89 21.68*
[110.317] [40.155] [11.064]
growth -3.453 4.271
[19.321] [10.788]
gdp p.c. -0.000153 -0.0000778 -0.000107***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
gdp 0.645 0.272 0.170
[0.508] [0.374] [0.158]
pop65 0.395*** 0.368* 0.468***
[0.177] [0.215] [0.138]
service 0.165* 0.118 0.0798*
[0.086] [0.093] [0.042]
partisanship -0.560*** -0.199 -0.0425
[0.219] [0.335] [0.173]
veto 0.274 0.223 0.293
[0.306] [0.444] [0.223]
democracy 1.209 0.925 0.553
[0.793] [0.864] [0.373]
majority 3.575 2.495 1.538
[3.590] [4.741] [2.288]
enpp 0.0528*** 0.0278 0.0180
[0.024] [0.106] [0.013]
transition peers 0.337 0.293 -0.0283
[0.207] [0.235] [0.132]
Latin peers . 0.613* 0.395***
. [0.318] [0.163]
y_dist_sd(t-1) -6.977*** -5.072***
[2.511] [2.064]
year 228.3 238.3***
[167.155] [111.842]
_cons -1762.6 -18.20 -1822.2***
[1267.104] [17.843] [849.403]
N 565 725 714
pseudo R2 0.450 0.380 0.266
ll -201.2 -303.6 -351.3
chi2 110.8 79.50
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Appendix Table A-3: Average Predict Probabilities of Model (1) in Table 1 
country average predicted probability percentage of time private
Argentina 0.82 0.44
Armenia 0.04 0.00
Australia 0.53 0.62
Austria 0.06 0.00
Belgium 0.29 0.00
Bolivia 0.09 0.41
Brazil 0.66 0.00
Canada 0.21 0.00
Chile 0.89 0.98
Colombia 0.94 0.56
Costa Rica 0.83 0.35
Croatia 0.94 0.41
Czech Republic 0.80 0.06
Denmark 0.41 0.62
Dominican Republic 0.37 0.35
Ecuador 0.27 0.00
El Salvador 0.62 0.44
Estonia 0.81 0.35
Finland 0.26 0.00
France 0.40 0.00
Germany 0.35 0.35
Greece 0.07 0.00
Hungary 0.70 0.38
Iceland 0.09 0.00
Ireland 0.05 0.00
Italy 0.09 0.00
Jamaica 0.70 0.00
Japan 0.09 0.00
Latvia 0.81 0.35
Lithuania 0.69 0.33
Luxembourg 0.35 0.00
Mexico 0.79 0.47
Netherlands 0.40 0.59
New Zealand 0.10 0.21
Norway 0.17 0.00
Panama 0.42 0.15
Paraguay 0.22 0.00
Peru 0.94 0.59
Poland 0.33 0.44
Portugal 0.07 0.00
Romania 0.39 0.27
Slovak Republic 0.23 0.30
Slovenia 0.35 0.00
Spain 0.31 0.00
Sweden 0.56 0.56
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Switzerland 0.53 0.83
Turkey 0.00 0.00
Ukraine 0.37 0.00
United Kingdom 0.75 0.80
United States 0.28 0.00
Uruguay 0.22 0.50
Venezuela, RB 0.33 0.00
Total 0.42 0.25
Column 2 shows the predicted probabilities for each country according to model (1) of table 1;  
column 3 shows the number of years a country had a 2nd pillar as percentage of the whole period.
